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ABSTRACT

Is finance lease a financial instrument or property contract? This is the question that has
been recently debated among the policy makers and practitioners in the Egyptian Leasing
market within the discussions about the amendments of the Egyptian Leasing Law.
Instead of the formal approach of the recent law, the suggested amendment debatably
heads the economic reality of the transaction approach on the basis of it is more adequate
to the substance of finance lease. This thesis critically examines the two approaches
through representing the recent formal approach of Egyptian law, and the American
approach of finance lease as an example of the economic reality of the transaction
approach. This thesis argues that both approaches are formalistic in the sense they look to
some labels to attach to them rights and liabilities as a matter of logical deduction.
Furthermore, this thesis argues that this question is a policy question that its answer will
affect the bargaining powers of parties and the architect of jural relationships among the
parties of the transaction.
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I.

Introduction

In the recent discussions about the purported amendments of the Egyptian
Leasing Law, there has been a debate among the practitioners and policymakers whether
to apply the economic reality of the transaction, instead of the formal approach of the
current law, as a criterion to redistribute the rights, privileges, and powers among
parties.1 According to this controversy, the finance lease law should reflect the
considerations of the economic reality of the transaction or should it focus on the formal
title as an indication to the distributions of rights and liabilities among the parties of the
transaction?
The reason of this controversy, one can argue, is that finance lease contains two
elements, one is the financial element and the second is the legal form. Based on those
elements, legal systems use either one of two approaches to determine the legal nature of
finance lease. The first approach considers the substance of the transaction. Based on the
so-called economic reality, some countries grant the lessee what is called economic
ownership.2 Since the lessee has control over the leased assets, and bears all the risks of
that use, the lessee has the so called economic ownership.3On the other hand, many
countries have adopted another approach whereby the formality of ownership is the
determinative factor. “[Such an approach] accepts legal form as determinative ownership,
with special rules covering specific abuses.”4
The choice between the two approaches has many practical implications,
particularly in situations where there are disagreements between lessor and lessee on the
distributions and allocation of unforeseen costs, or the use of some rights and privileges

1

The author was a member of these discussions and holds unofficial records and minutes of the
discussions about the purported amendments.
2
WILLIAM W. PARK, Tax Characterization of International Leases: The Contours of Ownership, 67 Cornell L.
Rev. 105 ,1981-82. (Hereunder referred a Park The Contours of ownership.)
3
Id.
4
Id at 115, France is one of those counties that adopts the approach of formality.
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associated with ownership. To illustrate this controversy, I present a hypothetical case to
illustrate in concrete terms some of these practical implications.
Therefore, part A will illustrate this case, while parts B and C will present
respectively the two approaches to decide this case. Eventually, part D shows the
fallacious in both approaches and addresses the right question.
A. Hypothetical Case:
Assume that A is a contractor and needs to buy a bulldozer from a German
supplier. In order to finance the purchase of such bulldozer, A chooses to sign a finance
lease contract. After negotiating with the supplier and selecting the bulldozer, A
negotiates the lease terms with the financing company C. A and C negotiate the terms of
the lease indicating that C will fund up to 90% of the purchase price of such a bulldozer
and the lease term will cover 75% of the useful life of the bulldozer. In addition, at the
end of the lease term, A has the option of purchasing the bulldozer at a nominal price.
After reaching agreement, C imports the equipment at the expense of A, the lessee.
According to the finance lease terms, the supplier will deliver the bulldozer to C who
eventually will control it and bear all the risks and award the benefits of the residual
value. Here, three main questions will shape the arguments of each approach and the
argument this thesis raises.
First, should tax credits be allocated to the lessee or the lessor? In other words, for
the purpose of tax treatment, should the lessor or the lessee add the leased assets in their
balance sheets, and thus which one of them should depreciate the assets and deduct such
depreciation, as tax credit, from tax liabilities? Second, as the lessee selects the leased
assets, selects the supplier and the finance institution which will finance such leased
assets through finance lease, should the lessee have a direct legal relation vis-à-vis the
supplier and thus may lessee may directly claim the warranty and representation from the
supplier? Third, should the lessor or the lessee bear the sales taxes, customs and duties
and the like? For example, in a country imposes customs on the imported goods , should
the lessor bear the such customs duties because only the lessor is the holder of the legal

2

title? Or should the lessee bear such risk because these goods are imported for the use and
benefit of the lessee and the lessor acts merely as a finance conduit?

Two approaches have attempted to answer these questions though both have posed
the wrong question. Based on who the owner is of this asset, each of the approaches
answers these questions from a different angle.
B. Legal Form
As a first approach, some legal systems regard the legal form as the determinative
factor in finance lease.5 Formal ownership is the basis for the distribution of rights and
liabilities of parties. Based on this understanding of finance lease, the court will most
likely look for the holder of the legal title and thus will respond that the finance lessor is
the true owner. As logical deduction, the owner has all the rights and liabilities as a
matter of course in the absence of an explicit rule. Accordingly, the lessor may add the
assets to its balance sheet and depreciate them irrespective of the economic reality which
is that the lessor acts merely as the financial conduit. In addition, the lessor will be liable
of customs and other taxes associated with the formal ownership. For this approach, any
benefits or liabilities are attached to the title as logical deduction from the general
concept of ownership.
Egyptian law is an example of this approach that adopts legal form as a
determinative of ownership.6

Chapter II addresses the approach of Egyptian Law.

Following the legal form approach, Egyptian Law, for example, grants the lessor the right
to add the leased assets to its balance sheet and depreciate them.7
C. Economic Substance
Unlike the legal form approach, the economic reality of the transaction approach
looks for the true owner from a different angle. Based on the so-called economic reality
of the transaction, some countries grant the lessee what is called economic ownership.
5

E.g French law see Id at 115-18.
Law no. 95 of year 1995 articles 24 and 25. ( Hereinafter referred as Egyptian Leasing Law)
7
Id Egyptian Leasing Law art. 24.
6
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Since the lessee has control over the leased assets, and bears all the risks of that use, the
lessee has the so called economic ownership. Accordingly, the true owner, for tax
purposes, is the one who bears all the risks and is awarded all the benefits from residual
value. Therefore, the finance lessee, according to this approach, is the true owner and
thus is entitled to the depreciation and any tax credits.
Like the legal form approach, the economic reality of the transaction approach
identifies the “true” owner of the leased asset as the only question to be studied. For this
approach the legal form is not the determinative factor, but it is the so called economic
reality of the transaction. Therefore, in order to determine the “true” owner that enjoys
the tax credits, the court will approach this issue from another angle which is economic
reality of the transaction test. Who in reality does benefit from the residual value of the
leased assets? Who does bear the risk of leased assets? Who has control over the leased
assets?
This artificial distinction between the legal and non-legal concepts of property
would be a new type of conceptualization in the Egyptian legal context whereby legal
texts or judicial reasoning use new terms and link them with consequences to get around
the rigidity and formality of so-called formal ownership. For instance, the lessee under
finance lease has the economic ownership and thus is entitled to the depreciation of the
leased assets instead of the legal owner.8 As these terms may suggest, some court
decisions in the US have considered the lessee the “true” owner vis-à-vis the legal owner
or “lessor.”9 That is to say, the courts tend to deal with the term “ownership” as a “thing”
that can be divided vis-à-vis some laws into formal ownership and economic
ownership.10 The determinative aspect for them in such a case is economic reality.11

8

Park, The Contours of ownership, Supra note 2 at 115.
Da Rocha v. Macomber, 330 Mass. 611, 116 N.E.2d 139-40, Carlson v. Giacchetti, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 57,
616 N.E. 2d 812.
10
Compa, FELIX COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and Functional Approach, 15 Colum. L. Rev. 810. 1915.
(COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and Functional Approach)
11
Park, The Contours of ownership, Supra note 2 at 121-22.
9
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The United States and other legal systems use this approach to protect the
integrity of their tax systems.12 Professor Park describes this approach as a way “to
protect the integrity of the tax systems.”13 In so doing, some countries have adopted the
approach of economic ownership as a determinative factor as opposed to formal
ownership:
To protect the integrity of their tax systems, many nations
have rejected the imaginary world in which labels are legally
determinative. Instead, these countries frequently allocate tax
consequences in accordance with the economic substance of
the transactions. 14
D.

The Right Question:
Both approaches ask who the owner is. For the legal form approach, the question

is who the holder of the title is. On the other hand, the economic reality approach
questions who the bearer of economic risks is. Such language obfuscates the correct
understanding of legal relationships. It is a new conception that is being formulated in
order to solve cases under the alleged umbrella of logical deduction. Economic
ownership as such is not itself the determinative factor, nor is it the economic reality of
the transaction which is the basis of such reasoning. Likewise, it is not the formality of
the ownership which is the determinative factor nor is it the legal title. It is a form of a
vicious circle of reasoning.15 That is to say, assuming that the owner (formal/economic)
pays the tax because she is the owner is “[…] assum[ing] what it needs to be decided.”16
Fallacious as it seems, such arguments add nothing to our legal thinking. They affect the
economic benefits of the parties. Terms like title, economic reality, economic ownership,
or control are something the legislatures or courts use to redistribute the economic

12

Park, The Contours of ownership, Supra note 2 at 121-24. For Instance, German Tax Law has adopted
this approach of economic ownership to allocate the benefits of assets depreciations to the lessee as
economic owner.
13
Park, The Contours of ownership, Supra note 2 at 115.
14
Park, The Contours of ownership, Supra note 2 at.105.
15
COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and Functional Approach, Supra note 10 at 814.
16
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 641 1987-1988. (Hereinafter
referred as Singer, Reliance.)
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bargaining powers among the parties.17 Again, courts and legislatures apply the language
of logic as a link between some artificial terms to which they attach some legal
consequence.18
Chapter I addresses the Egyptian approach of legal form. In this chapter, one
realizes that the Egyptian Leasing19 ignores the economic and financial factors of finance
lease. Two problems, one can argue, face the Egyptian law maker: firstly, the rigid
concept of the ownership, and secondly, the false connotation that the owner has as a
logical deduction, all the rights, in a broad meaning of the word.
Chapter II, on the other hand, addresses the U.S law as an example of economic
ownership under finance lease. This approach rightly realizes the economic reality of
finance lease as a financial instrument. For this approach, the finance lease is a mere
financial conduit between the supplier of goods and the lessee as an ultimate purchaser of
the goods. This approach has ample advantages. However, it confuses the finance lease
with different kinds of contracts. As a result, this approach, despite its flexibility, exposes
the parties of the finance lease to unpredictability and uncertainty.
Chapter III presents Professor Hohfeld‟s analytical system to define finance lease
through the jural relationships the finance lease creates within underlying policies. As
result, one can distinguish between the finance lease and different kinds of contracts
through reducing the different transactions to the lowest terms of the eight fundamental
terms of the Hohfeldian system.
To conclude this thesis, one recommends reform of the Egyptian Leasing law to
realize the financial and economic factors of finance lease without using the artificial
labels of economic ownership that result only in confusion and arbitrary treatment.
17

ROBERT L. HALE, Coercion and Distribution in A Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POLITICAL
SCIENCE QUARTERLY 470 (1923) (Hereinafter referred as Hale, Coercion).
18
Guy v. Donald 203 U.S. 399, 406, in this case the renown justice Holmes says “As long as the matter to
be considered is debated in artificial terms there is danger of being led by a technical definition to apply a
certain name, and then to deduce consequences which have no relation to the grounds on which the
name was applied.”
19
Law no. 95 of the year 1995 amended by Law no. 16 of year 2001.
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II.

The Formal Approach: Case of Egypt
The central point in finance lease is the concept of property. Although the

Egyptian Leasing Law does not explicitly define the property, it is, as I argue,
understandable from the outset of the law that Egyptian Leasing Law follows the formal
concept of property as a determinative factor in the following two senses. It is formal is
the strict sense of the term in as much as it gives the possession of the formal title (e.g.
proof of registration at traffic authority, real estate registry, or leasing registry) the
deciding weight in determining the allocation of property rights. It is formal in the more
expansive and conceptual sense in as much as it presumes that rights, powers and
privileges of the owner are known a priori, and can be deduced logically from the
concepts of property and ownership. In other words, Egyptian law follows the assumption
that the legal owner has absolute and “ultimate control over the disposition of a thing or a
set of resources.”20 Fallacious as it seems, the question posed by the Egyptian lawmaker
is: who is the legal owner? Having answered this question, one then erroneously assumes
that this owner has systematically all rights and liabilities of such a thing. The concept of
property is thus considered to be merely a relationship between the owner and a thing.
Singer correctly observes in his commentary work about the concept of property concept
in US law that:
[P]hrasing the problem as "identifying the owner" is
fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right question.
To assume that we can know who property owners are,
and to assume that once we have identified them their
rights follow as a matter of course, is to assume what
needs to be decided. 21
To establish the relationship between finance lease and the classical concept of
property, part A of this chapter analyzes the finance lease under Egyptian Law no. 95 of
1995 amended by the law no. 16 of 2001. It will present the complex, but artificial
treatment by which the Egyptian lawmaker approaches the subject of finance lease. The

20
21

SINGER, Reliance, Supra note16 at 637.
SINGER, Reliance, Supra note16 at 641.
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vacuum in Egyptian law results in confusion regarding the characterization of finance
lease as being a lease or a sales contract.
Part B addresses Egyptian legal thought on property. In this part, one can argue
that Egyptian legal thought can be described as being mostly formalistic in the sense of
its being a rigid and absolutistic approach to conceptualizing property. This part will
merely deal with the contribution of Professor Al Sanhuri, the renowned scholar and the
father of Egyptian modern legal thought, concerning property law.
Part C challenges this approach on the basis that formal ownership is not the
determinative factor in finance lease. The argument raised here is fundamental. The
controversy about property is illusive; the correct question should focus on the underlying
policy and the corresponding set of legal relationships. Therefore, this part addresses two
main criticisms to the formal approach; it is arbitrary in the sense that it presumes solving
the underlying policy through identifying the holder of the formal title. Furthermore, it is
formalistic in the sense that it presumes that once it identifies the formal owner (holder of
the title) all rights, powers, privileges, and liabilities would follow such owner as a
logical deduction from the concept of formal property.
Part D concludes Egyptian Leasing Law depending on the thinking of Egyptian
law about property affected the realization of the mere nature of finance lease as a
financial instrument. Thus, this law entails vacuum in its architect that exposes the two
parties to unpredicted risks. In addition, this approach is formalistic in the sense that it
depends mere on identifying the owner and then attaches to such owner all the rights and
liabilities without any further considerations.

8

A.
Formal Ownership As The Distinctive Feature of Egyptian Leasing
Law:
The Egyptian lawmaker enacted Finance Lease Law no. 95 of 1995.

22

Finance lease as a contemporary financial instrument has developed tremendously in the
global market.23 Often, finance lease will provide up to 100% of the finances necessary to
purchase equipment and real estate required for business purposes.24 Finance lease also
provides a non-cancelable finance period.25 Due to the relationship between finance lease
and the business purposes required for the financing, finance lease provides working
capital to the market that in many cases enables an increase in productivity and
enhancement of economic development.26 However, the Egyptian lawmaker understands
finance lease as a sub – category of other ownership-related contracts.27

In order to portray the approach of Egyptian law, this part presents the definition
of finance lease under Egyptian law. It will then argue that Egyptian Law is not capable
of fully covering the legal relationship between lessor and lessee in particular regarding
economic reality. Thus, one can conclude that the law suffers from a serious vacuum that
exposes the lessor and lessee to potential risks and poses constraints for characterizing
the relationship between lessor and lessee.

1. Definition of Finance Lease:
Similar to the formal approach, the Egyptian Leasing Law focuses on formal
ownership in portraying finance lease. Although, it does not provide an explicit definition

22

QADRI ABDEL FADAH, Qanaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwely Raqam 95 sanat 1995 Mau c dal Baqanun Raqam 16 sanat
2001, Drasa Moqarana (Finance Leasing Law no, 95 of year 1995 amended by law 16 of year 2001 and its
executive regulation, A Comparative Study,) 33-37 (2005) (hereinafter referred as Abdel Fadah, Qqnaun Al
Ta'jeer El Tamwelay
23
Id.
24
STUART GLASS, The Principles, in Finance Lease 30 ( Tom Clark ed. , 2 ed. 1990).
25
Id at 31.
26
Id at 32.
27
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 40.
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for finance lease, the Egyptian law adopts three illustrations of the finance lease
relationships:
(1) Tripartite Relationships:28
The first image of finance lease the Egyptian law adopts is the tripartite
relationship whereby the lessor leases to the lessee an asset that he received from a
supplier, manufacturer or contractor.29 Needless to say, such a relationship includes a sale
relationship between the supplier and the lessor. Conversely, the lessee has no legal
relationship vis-à-vis the supplier, except that the supplier has to deliver the leased asset
to the lessee. In return he will receive delivery minutes from the lessee showing that the
lessee has no objection and thus accepts the asset.30 In addition, the lessee can “negotiate
directly with the supplier or the contractor concerning the specifications of the property
necessary for his project or the method of making or establishing it.”31

This first representation obscures, rather than emphasizes, the economic substance
of finance lease. The law ignores the reality that the lessor is a mere financier, and that
instead the lessee, selects the assets, the supplier, and elects the financing lease as a
mechanism of finance.32 Instead, the legislator of the Finance Lease Law has chosen the
analogy of the classical tenant contract and applied it to the finance lease.33

28

ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 44.
Egyptian Leasing Law no. 95 of year 1995, art 2-1, Abdel Fadah, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra
note 22 at 45.
30
Egyptian Leasing Law no. 95 of year 1995, art. 8, Abdel Fadah, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note
22 at 44-45.
31
Egyptian Leasing Law no. 95 of year 1995, art. 7, Abdel Fadah, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note
22 at 44-45 (2005).
32
CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. Law. 1605 1980- 1981 “ Leasing
companies which are essentially suppliers of monay typically do not maintain inventories of equipment.
The actual supplier is a distributor or manufacturer which has dealt directly with the lessee. Having
chosen the equipment the lessee may elect to lease it from the leasing company as financing
mechanism.”
33
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 77-78.
29
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(2) Bilateral Relationships:
In the second and third images, the law limits the finance lease relationship to a
relationship between lessor and a lessee. According to articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the Leasing
Law the finance lease can be:
ii- All contracts by virtue of which the lessor is
committed to lease to the lessee realties or
installations owned by the lessor or established at his
expense with the aim of leasing them to the lessee…
iii- All contracts by virtue of which the lessor is
committed to lease to the lessee a property under
financial lease if the ownership of this property has
devolved to the lessor from the lessee. 34 [Free
translation by author]
In both images the law treats the lessor as mere owner and the lessee is a mere
user analogously to the classical tenant contract. However, the law gives the purchase
option to the lessee at the end of the leasing period.35
From the outset of these images, professor Qadri defines the finance lease under
Egyptian law as follows:
According to [the images], a finance lease is the
transaction related to financing capital equipment
from the lessor not in purpose to own it or to transfer
the ownership to the lessee, instead it aims at
providing the use of such equipment to the lessee
against the rentals without forcing the lessee to
purchase it at the end of lease. 36 [Free translation by
the author.]

34

Egyptian Leasing Law, Supra note 6 art. 2-3.
Egyptian Leasing Law, Supra note 6 art. 5. ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 7778.
36
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 38.
35
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This definition envisages the finance lease as the relationship between owner- the financial company - and user whereby the latter can use capital equipment by the
former.

2. The Implication Of The Definition On Accounting Standards And
Tax Treatment

The emphasis the legislative definition makes on the relationship between owner and
user affects two major parts of the law; the accounting standards and tax treatment.

a) Accounting Standards
To distinguish the finance lease from other contracts, especially installment sales and
operating leases, the law adopts a distinctive accounting categorization whereby the law
requires the incorporation of a purchase option with an encouraging price along with the
fulfillment of any of the two requirements:
a- The contract covers 75% or more of the useful life of the equipment; or
b- The current value of the contract constitutes 90% or more of the market value of
the leased asset. 37
b) Tax Treatment:
Again, the law focuses on the relationship between the owner and the user in
order to define the tax relationship between lessor and lessee. The lessor as legal owner
can add the leased asset to its balance sheet and depreciate the assets accordingly. 38 The
lessee, on the other hand, deducts the monthly installments of the lease contract as
expenses and the leased assets will not appear on the balance sheet of the lessee.39
Although such a tax treatment gives incentives to both lessee and lessor, it ignores the

37

ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 135-137.
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 140-142.
39
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 140-142.
38
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reality of finance lease as a financial instrument for the lessee to purchase the leased
assets through the lease arrangement.40

In this context, characterizing the relationship between the lessee and the lessor is
vital. The following section, therefore, will discuss the characterization of the
relationship under finance lease.

3. The Consequences Of The Ambiguity Of The Definition
Additional to the effects of the legislative definition on the accounting standards
and tax treatment, the ambiguity of the legislative definition results in overlap between
different transactional relationships. It further results in vacuum in the law regarding
warranties or the relationship between the supplier and the lessee.

a) Finance lease v. personal property lease (tenant contract):
Egyptian law characterizes, one argues, the finance lease as a classical tenancy
contract. In doing so, the law defines the relationship between the owner-lessor and
user-lessee.41 The Lessor as a legal owner transfers the right of use to the lessee.
Although this image of finance lease gives the lessor a security in case of default of the
lessee and gives the lessor the priority over the lessee‟s creditors in bankruptcy, 42 this
image ignores the purely financial intention of the lease, and while granting certain
advantages also exposes the leasing company to the risks attached to the ownership.43
Such risks entail the warranties, representations, and any other risks that are attached to
the ownership vis-à-vis the lessee or vis-à-vis a third party.

40

MOONEY, Personal Property Leasing ,Supra note 32 at 1605. PARK, The Contours of ownership, supra note
2 at 1607.
41
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 68-69.
42
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 68-69.
43
ABDEL FADAH, Qqnaun Al Ta'jeer El Tamwelay, Supra note 22 at 68-69.

13

b) Warranties:
Typically, the lessor is a financial institution. However, being the owner of the
leased assets, the lessor, according to Egyptian Civil Code,44 guarantees for invisible
defects, the maintenance and the like. However, this image is unrealistic. Indeed, the
lessee elects the finance lease as financing instrument to fund the purchase and use of
capital equipment.45 The lessee selects the leased assets, the supplier, the manufacturer,
and may negotiate the price.46 Conversely, the law deals with this reality as irrelevant and
characterizes the finance lease as a relationship between owner and lessee. This image is
problematic to both the lessor and lessee. For the lessor, this scenario exposes the lessor
to the risks of securing the condition of the leased asset that the lessor does not select or
know about.47 Furthermore, this understanding exposes the lessor to the risk of
maintenance.48 Acting as a mere financial institution, the lessor will typically shift all
these risks to the lessee by means of an artificial contractual arrangement.49

For the lessee, this scenario does not provide any safeguards. On the contrary, the
lessee is not entitled to claim the warranties and representatives directly from the
supplier, since the law does not recognize any legal relationship between the lessee and
the supplier.50 In addition, practice shows that typically by contract the lessee waives any
claims regarding the warranties and representations vis-à-vis the lessor, thus leaving the
lessee without any safeguards.51

To exemplify, assume B, the lessee, wants to purchase digging equipment from C
- the supplier. But B does not have the capital for such equipment to purchase itself. B
seeks finance leasing as an alternative means of financing through A- the finance leasing
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company. Therefore, B selected the equipment, supplier and the financier. Furthermore,
B negotiated the price and determined the technical description of such equipment.
However, it is for the purpose of legal arrangement that A as lessor has to purchase such
equipment directly from C for the interest of B. A and C sign a sales agreement without
having directly negotiated such agreement. Then A transfers the right to use the
equipment to B and retains the title through a finance lease contract. In legal terms,
though formalistic, B has no contractual relationship with C. Yet, B is the actual user of
the equipment provided by C. In this case, the question of who is entitled to the
warranties arises. The Egyptian leasing law has not answered this question. 52 In the
absence of a specific rule, the general rule of sales contracts in Civil Law applies.
Therefore, the purchaser, who is the lessor, is the only one who is entitled to the
warranties and representatives. The lessee, on the other hand, has no right vis-à-vis the
supplier regarding the warranties and representations. This unrealistic situation creates
constraints for both the lessee and the lessor. The lessor, who is typically a mere
financier, does not have any interest in the leased assets and thus it can not guarantee the
soundness and fitness of the leased assets, neither can the lessor present any warranties or
representations to the lessee.53 Conversely, the lessee, the one who selects the leased
asset, the supplier, the financing company and the financial instrument, is very interested
in the soundness and good condition of the leased assets, and thus the warranties and
representations are vital for the lessee. Therefore, typically the finance lease contract
entails a waiver clause whereby the lessee waives any claim against the lessor regarding
the representations and warranties.54 On the other hand, the lessor gives the right to the
lessee to claim such warranties and representation directly from the supplier.55 To
mitigate any risk of losing the title as security, the lessor explicitly prevents the lessee
from claiming the cancellation of the sales contract in case of supplier failure or default
in any of its obligation towards the lessor.56 Therefore, the lessee bears all the risks of
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selecting the supplier and leased assets without having any way to cancel the contract
with the supplier in case of a breach of contract by that supplier with the lessor.57
c)

Ownership risks vis-à-vis third parties:
The law adopts ownership as a characteristic feature to distinguish finance lease

from other financial instruments, such as loan agreements.58 Therefore, the formal
ownership is the distinctive feature the lawmaker adopts in defining finance leases.
However, this exposes the lessor to unpredictable risks that are by law attached to
ownership in the absence of otherwise explicit rules. Customs, traffic, or tax liabilities are
examples of such risks. Therefore, the finance lease contract usually includes a condition
that shifts all and any such potential risks the lessor may incur resulting from him being
the owner onto the lessee.59
d) Lease disguises sale:
If the lessee is granted a purchase option at the end of the term of the lease
contract, controversy about the legal nature of such contract arises; is it a “true lease” or
“conditioned sale disguised as lease”?60 Coogan summarizes the reality of the transaction
as a reason for this controversy stating that:
[The lease parties were] interested in creating an
equipment leasing device for use by prospective
lessees . . . who desire the use of capital goods for
which they cannot afford to pay cash outright but
which a financing lessor in another Contracting State
is willing to furnish if given at least minimal
protection that he can regain possession if payment is
not made. 61
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Therefore, the distinguishing line between lease and sale is abolished in the case
where the ownership is recognized as mere security to the lessor in case of default. 62 The
ownership, therefore, secures the lessor from the default of the lessee by giving the lessor
the right to repossess the leased asset, especially in the case of bankruptcy.63
However, Al-Sanhuri considers the purchase option in the lease contract with a nominal
price a conditioned sale according to article 430 of Civil Code.64 Thus, for Al- Sanhuri
the lease is a scam that disguises a regular sale transaction.65 Based on Article 430 of the
Civil Law,66 the consequences are twofold:

First, the ownership is transferred to the lessee on the condition of payment of the
installments, and thus the lessee can dispose of the leased asset.

Second, in case of bankruptcy the lessor cannot repossess the leased asset nor has
any priority over the lessee‟s other creditors. 67
In response to such arguments highlighting the similarities between finance lease and
conditioned sale, Coogon rightly emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between
regular lease and finance lease:
Distinguishing between leases and secured
transactions is important for determining remedies on
default, and for other purposes as well. For example,
if the hypotheticals contained a bankruptcy
proceeding involving a lease, the supplier's or
financer's rights as a lessor … would have differed
greatly from his rights as a secured party under a
lease for security.
[It] is correct in saying that a lease and an installment
sale are alike in that each is a method by which a
62
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prospective user obtains the use of equipment for
which he is unable or unwilling to pay cash outright.
They are unlike in that under a lease, as under all
bailments, the lessee becomes the owner only by
stepping out of his bailee shoes and stepping into the
shoes of a purchaser, as, for example, when he
obtains the right to use the equipment to the point of
practical exhaustion or has the option to buy the
equipment at the end of the lease term for a bargain
price which no sensible person would refuse to
exercise. If he is a purchaser, his equity will be built
up with each payment.68

Although one can disagree with the scenario of this argument as it obfuscates
correct legal thinking regarding finance lease, it rightly emphasizes the importance of
distinguishing between finance lease and conditioned sale. Understanding finance lease
as a regular sale exposes the lessor to credit risks in the case of the lessee‟s default. In
addition, it contradicts the idea of finance lease and abolishes the lines between different
financial instruments.
To sum up, one can argue that the ownership plays a pivotal role in Egyptian
finance lease law. Following the attachment of the property label, Egyptian law portrays
the finance lease as a relationship between the legal owner and the mere user of the asset.
Despite the advantages of this approach, ownership poses constraints to the accurate legal
thinking regarding the legal nature of finance lease. In addition, it leaves a vacuum in the
present law exposing both parties to potential risks, especially lessees who typically are
in weaker bargaining positions. One can question the plausibility of the Egyptian
approach of basing consequences of law merely on the identification of the legal owner.
The formalism the Egyptian approach to finance lease is embedded in the larger context
of the Egyptian private law , especially Civil Code, and reflects its characteristics.
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B. Egyptian formalistic approach of conceptualizing property (Al-Sanhuri’s
dual approach):

Egyptian legal thought on property relates to political and social change. In the
case of Egypt and in fact the entire Arabic region two cultures and consequently two
schools of legal thought met. On the one had, is the legal school of religious based
thinking of Islamic scholars and on the other the school of secular thinking of the
scholars of the ruling imperialist European nations. This conflict is evident if one looks at
the division of the judicial system in Egpyt at that time into national courts and mixed
courts. While the former applied the rule of Shari’a codified in the Murshid al-hayran,69
the latter applied positive law derived from European nations.70
1. Al Sanuhri and Dualism:71
To unify the Egyptian legal systems, Al Sanhuri, the father of the Egyptian
modern legal thought and the drafter of the Egyptian Civil Code, tried to bridge the gap
between the secular and non-secular legal thinking when drafting the Civil Code. In so
doing, ”[Al-Sanhuri] emphasize[d] the discovery of the principles of legal right
embedded in the Shari’a and the need to submit them to a kind of forced evolution so that
they could become functional for contemporary contexts.”72 Yet, a closer study of
property law under the Egyptian Civil Code will lead the careful reader to the conclusion
that natural legal thought is the dominant point in Sanhuri‟s legal concept of property. 73
Professor Hill emphasizes that in the duality system used by Al-Sanhuri to bridge the gap
between positive and nature legal thought, the non-secular Islamic thought has prevailed:
Although Al Sanhuri‟s efforts to develop a modern
law suitable for modern Arab countries had as its
central concern the induced evolution of rules derived
69
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from the corpus of the jurisprudence of Islamic
jurists, he was quite specific that the revision of law
must take account of present as well as historical
experiences of each country. [...] This meant that in
Iraq, where the Majalla was the basic civil law in
force at the time, the new code was to be “more
Islamic” than the code of Egypt where there had been
a history of using French law for some fifty years.
Although at the time of its passage in 1948 there was
considerable criticism that the new Civil Code of
Egypt was not sufficiently Islamic, the record of
revision activities (Ministry of Justice) shows the
detailed, studied consideration that went into this new
code and how and why various articles derived either
from the letter or the spirit of the Shari’a. 74
Under the assumption that this is an accurate description, the study of the concept
of property under Islamic Law is relevant to the concept of property under Egyptian Law
as conceptualized by El-Sanhuri.

2. The Definition of Property under Islamic Jurisprudence:

Property is a fundamental concept in Islamic jurisprudence.75 Islamic
jurisprudence has many approaches when it comes to defining property. 76 “The clearer
definition is that property is the sole, despotic and exclusive dominion of one over a thing
against the universe that gives the owner the absolute right to dispose of it except
otherwise it is religiously prohibited.”77 Al Khafif emphasizes that within the different
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approaches that can be found, there are four common aspects. 78The first common aspect
espoused by Al Khafif relates to the metaphysics of property, or in other words the
religious dimension of the concept of property whereby property is the religious
description or religious permission based on which one is religiously allowed to own a
thing.79 While – according to this approach – Allah, God to whom be ascribed all
perfection and majesty, owns everything on the earth, he has nevertheless appointed
someone as the successor over such thing.80

The second common aspect is the imagery of property as a relationship between
someone and something. Islamic jurisprudence emphasizes the objectivity of property as
a relationship between someone and something. However, there is a dispute about the
nature of that “something,” especially, whether incorporeal things can be the object of
property or not.81 Some Islamic schools limit the object of property to such corporeal
things that can be physically held.82 Other schools argue that incorporeal things can be
the object of property, if the customs of the people at the time give value to such things,
and consequently allow trading with such incorporeal things.83

The third common aspect that Al Khafif posits is the absolutism of property with
some exceptions. Islamic scholars emphasize the absolute dominion of the owner over
the thing that he owns and whereby he exercises exclusive rights and enjoys absolute
privileges against the universe. This absolute power is only limited by exceptions found
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in the religious orders or others‟ interests.84 For this school, property is an “in rem
right.”85

The fourth and final common aspect is the formalistic property concept as such is
decisive. That is to say, a property right includes the right to dispose of such property at
the owners will. In other word, it is “the image of the owner as a person who has ultimate
control over the disposition of a thing or a set of resources [in the absence of
provisions.]”86
Hence, one can argue, that property law under Egyptian civil law is affected by the
natural school of Islamic jurisprudence.
3. Property under Egyptian Civil Law (Al-Sanhuri’s dual approach):
Al-Sanhuri utilized the natural law thoughts and formalistic approach to define
property. Property for him is a right in rem in the sense of a relationship between
someone and something.87 Therefore, the Egyptian Civil Code defines property as being
something that ”is for the owner of a thing only, within the limits of law, the right to use
and dispose of it.”88
Obvious as it may seem, the Egyptian law utilizes the classical definition of
property. It evokes the definition of Blackstone as quoted by Professor Singer:89
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Blackstone defined property as "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in
the universe." We still carry in our heads an image of
the "owner" as a person who has ultimate control
over the disposition of a thing or a set of resources.

Professor Al-Sanhuri, in his valuable opinion, though erroneous from the realistic
perspective, defines property along these lines as the fundamental right in rem, and thus
he states:
It may be concluded from the definition of property
right in the article is that that the right of owning a
thing connotes the exclusive power of the owner over
it and the sole right to use and dispose of it constantly
within the limits of law. 90 [Free translation by the
author]
This valuable commentary work of Professor Al Sanhuri, that Egyptian judges
and lawyers even today cite, infers the following aspects of property under the Egyptian
system.

The first aspect relates to the absolutism of property. This connotation brings
about the classical model that understands property as a castle.91 The owner of the thing
can do whatever he pleases within the boundaries of his “castle,” or in other words, the
owner has an absolute advantage over the object of property within the boundaries of the
law.92 In the absence of such boundaries or to leave the metaphoric realm, in the absence
of a rule of law, the owner has all the advantages, rights, duties, immunities, and
privileges.93 That is to say that the restriction of property is the exception. The absolutist
element of property is also emphasized by Egyptian legal scholars and courts. Professor
90
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Mohamed Kamel Morsi states that “property is absolute as a general rule except in such
cases in which the law restricts it.”94 This absolutistic aspect of property is also
emphasized by the Cassation Supreme Court:
In the absence of a rule of law, it is for the owner of a
thing only, as a general rule, within the limits of law,
the right to use and to dispose of the object of its
property at her discretion according to article 802.
This indicates that the owner has the right to choose
the lessee, and to exclude such a lessee at the expiry
of the tenant period, and to the owner only to use its
property in the way at her discretion. 95

Another important aspect of property in Egyptian law, though fallacious in the eyes of
realists, is the physicality of property. For Al-Sanhuri, property is the basic right in rem.96
It is a right over the thing which gives the owner the sole advantage to use it.97 The right
itself, so this argument goes, is incorporeal, but its object must be corporeal.98 Therefore,
Al-Sanhuri does not deem the patent as property in the strict meaning of the term, since
the object of the right is not corporeal.99

The third aspect of property in Egyptian law is that property is a permanent right.
For Al-Sanhuri the property right is attached to its object, and thus it only exists as long
as the object exists.

100

This does not mean that a property right is not transferrable. On

the contrary, it is transferrable between persons but property is attached to the thing
which is the object of the transfer.101 Therefore, this right, by its nature, cannot be
temporary. To exemplify this, an agreement, whereby A agrees with B to be the owner
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for a period of five years and after this time the property will be transferred back to B
has, according to Al-Sanhuri‟s understanding, to be considered as null and void.102

The valuable work of Professor Al-Sanhuri enriched Egyptian legal thinking.
Nevertheless, his approach to defining property is more formalistic than realistic. Such a
formalistic definition is misleading and neglects the more appropriate understanding of
property as a relationship between legal persons and not merely between a person and a
thing. Professor Singer attacked this approach to defining property in his commentary
article on property law in the US:
Yet this image never has been more than partially
correct. Much of the first-year property course in law
schools is devoted to examining ways in which
property interests can be shared or divided up. It is
old-fashioned, misleading and unproductive to
identify a single "owner" of valued resources when
control of those resources has been divided by law or
contract among several interested parties. It is, in
fact, a form of transcendental nonsense… [P]hrasing
the problem as "identifying the owner" is
fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right
question. To assume that we can know who property
owners are, and to assume that once we have
identified them their rights follow as a matter of
course, is to assume what needs to be decided. 103

For the purpose of this thesis, two main critiques towards this formalistic
approach shall be made. The first relates to the fallacious connotation this approach
brings about, whereby identifying the owner connotes that the owner allocates all the
advantages and disadvantages of the property.

The second critique concerns the physicality of the property in the form of the
relationship between the owner and the thing. By ignoring the reality of property as being
a legal relationship between individuals, Egyptian law prevents itself from understanding
102
103
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property in a way that would more match the new forms property has taken in economic
reality. One of these forms which is heavily affected by the classical concept of property
is finance lease. Professor Singer, in U.S. law, addresses this incapability of the same
classical view of property to develop with economic reality:
Property interests can be divided in various ways,
including: (1) overtime (current versus future
interests); (2) into co-ownership (joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, partnership, corporations); (3)
into leases (landlord/tenant relations); (4) into trusts
(trustee/beneficiary); (5) into easements and
covenants;
and
(6)
into
mortgages
(mortgagor/mortgagee).Who owns the property in
these cases? The landlord or the tenant? The trustee
or the beneficiary? The mortgagor or the mortgagee?
The question is meaningless. Just as the landlord, life
tenant, defeasible fee owner, trustee, and fee simple
owner may be "owners" of property, so may tenants,
reversioners, trust beneficiaries, holders of future
interests, and owners of easements. There are even
cases in which it is difficult to identify anyone as the
owner. Who owns a university? The board of
trustees? The graduates? The students? When several
parties share legal rights in property, any
identification of a single person as the "owner" is
likely to be both arbitrary and misleading. It is
arbitrary because we could just as easily identify
someone else as the owner. It is misleading because it
denies the existence of joint interests and the need to
determine the legal relations among all the persons
with legally protected interests in the property. The
"owner's" rights are limited by the rights of others
with entitlements in the property. Identifying the
owner does not tell us who these other people are or
what their rights are. 104

Therefore, for the following discussion it is relevant to look at how the classical
approach of property affects finance lease under Egyptian law.
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C. The Implication of Applying The Classical Concept of Property to Finance Lease:

As it is demonstrated in part B, leasing under Egyptian law is a relationship
between owner and user.105 Therefore, this classical property concept has been a serious
obstacle for the legislature at the time the Leasing Law was enacted. The classical
approach to the concept of property, one argues, brings about two problems that the
legislature faced.
The first problem originates in the image of property as a consolidated block of
rights. This intuitive image of property caused the lawmaker to draft the law with the
presumption that attaching the ownership to the lessor is the only thing the legislature had
to do.106 This assumption indicates that the lessor as the legal owner allocates all the
rights as a matter of course. However, since the lessor acts as mere financier in a finance
lease, the legislature had to develop an artificial architecture when drafting the law in
order to balance the economic interests of the parties involved in a finance lease. In this
context, the legislature had to try to circumvent the rigidity of the concept of property that
the law was generally using.

The second problem is the physicality of the object of property. That is to say, it is
the relationship between a person and a thing. This “thingification”107 of property is in
contrast to the purpose of finance leasing whereby the physical object of property is not
the center of the relationships of finance lease, instead it is the bundle of rights this
contract creates.108 Therefore, the legislature has to artificially interpret the law such that
it would reflect this reality and to circumvent the rigidity of the owner-property
relationship.
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The Egyptian legislature presumes the imagery of property as block which can be
transferred from one party to another party.109 This approach is formalistic, because the
legislature applies the concept of property inexorably as a general term without regard to
other options to which that concept can refer to if it is applied as jural relationships and a
bundle of correlatives and opposites.110 In this context, one can argue that it is the fallacy
of circularity to logically deduce ownership or property can determine who the owner is.
The question itself, as Professor Singer aptly argues, is not determinative in the case of
economic relationships:111
[P]hrasing the problem as "identifying the owner" is
fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right
question. To assume that we can know who property
owners are, and to assume that once we have
identified them their rights follow as a matter of
course, is to assume what needs to be decided.
The following example illustrates the fallacy in this formalistic approach:

A medical company desires to import diagnostic equipment. This company selects a
Chinese supplier as it is the cheapest one that supplies this equipment with the similar
technical description. Still, the medical company does not have the working capital to
import this equipment. For accounting and tax treatment, the medical company elects
finance lease as mean to import this equipment. The medical company submitted a
request to the finance lease company stating the financial and technical descriptions and
attached to this request the supplier offer. After accepting the transaction, the finance
lease paid the supplier and imported the said diagnostic equipment. The customs
authority claims 20% customs duty over the lessor. The lessor paid this amount and
debited it on the medical company‟s account. The lessee refused these costs on the basis
that it is a mere user of the equipment and lessor is the formal owner that holds the title.
As a counter argument, the lessor argues that although it is the holder of the title , it
109
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imported this equipment for the interest and according to the lessee desires. In addition,
the lessor acts merely as a fund provider. The lessor argues further that this equipment
was released from customs through the lessee‟s representative that was aware of the
customs duties. Finally the lessor argues that benefit of the use, residual value, and the
operation of such equipment is for the lessee. The question here, who should bear the
customs duties on the imported leased assets. Is the lessor who only has the title, but it
does not select these leased assets, the supplier, the manufacturer or the origin of these
lease assets? Or is it the lessee that benefits from the function, the residual value, and the
use of it? This shows that formal approach of property concept would be illusive to attach
to the title all rights, privileges, and liabilities as logical deduction from the formal
concept of ownership. By nevertheless choosing this approach in principle, the Egyptian
legislator exposes the lessor to unpredicted costs and weakens the lessor bargaining
powers in the leasing market. It also poses constraints in the face of finance lease market.
Yet, this approach adds nothing to our legal thinking. Therefore, the concept of property
is not the answer. This a policy question to be addressed by the policymaker. However,
assuming that the lessor is the owner and the rights will be attached to her as a matter of
course, is assuming what needs to be decided.112

To conclude , the lawmaker faces two problems at the time of enactment of the
Leasing Law as a result of the classical legal concept of property: Firstly that the legal
form is the determinative factor to identify the owner and secondly that (the false
connotation that) all rights and duties are attached to the ownership as a matter of course.
Therefore, once the court has identified the owner, it is not necessary for it to decide any
other questions.

D. Formal Ownership Is Not The Answer
The Egyptian lawmaker in the case of the Finance Lease Law treats the finance
lease as mere property contract, and thus the law ignores the financial factor of finance
112
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lease. This fallacy results, one argues, from the rigid concept of property in the Civil
Code. Identifying the owner is not the right answer for finance lease, since the finance
lessor acts merely as a financial intermediary between the supplier and lessee - ultimate
purchaser. In addition, finance lease for the lessee is a mere finance instrument whereby
the lessee can obtain the working capital required for its business. Ignoring these facts
exposes both parties to unpredictability risks. In addition, it increases the transition costs
for both parties at the time of contracting in order to predict the potential risks which
may result from the vacuum in the Egyptian law. Therefore, one can question, at this
point, whether it is not better for the Egyptian regulatory system of finance lease to
approach the economic reality of the transaction system as underlying policy. Chapter
three shows that the realization of the best function of finance lease requires full
understanding of the economic reality of the transaction. However, as demonstrated in
chapter three, this is not the right answer to the right question.
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III. The Economic Reality of The Transaction Approach: Case of The US

Similar to the formal approach, finance lease under the economic reality of the
transaction approach is the relationship between owner holder of the title and user in the
strict sense, or it is a relationship between a lessor and lessee in cases of sub-leases. To
distinguish between both parties, the economic reality of the transaction approach, unlike
the formal approach, considers the economic reality of the transaction as the
determinative factor of the allocation of rights, powers and privileges.113 This approach in
particular in the US, creates the so-called “economic ownership” as a distinctive
alternative to formal ownership.114 While the latter is attributed to the lessor, the holder of
the formal title, the former is attributed to the lessee that bears all the risks, awards
substantially the benefit of the residual values, and controls the leased assets.115 Based on
the so called economic reality of the transaction, this approach considers the lessor as a
mere financier and the lessee as the ultimate purchaser of the leased assets.116 This
approach, thus, logically deduces the allocation of rights, powers, and privileges to one
party through identifying the true owner.117 However, this approach results in an
incoherent system that governs the finance lease and an overlap between different labels.
Whether finance lease is a conditioned sale, a loan, a security agreement, or a “true” lease
has been and remains the question for courts and scholars to answer in each case.

Although one can agree with the concept of economic reality of finance lease, one
can argue that this approach is as fallacious as the purely formalistic formal approach. On
the one hand, the system of economic reality is incoherent in the sense that this approach
gives different answers to its question about the true owner. This approach on the other
hand, is formalistic in the sense that it looks for a suitable label under which they can
allocate the “ownership-block” to one party and attach to it some rights and liabilities as a
logical deduction from the general term. Thus, this approach does not, one can argue, ask
113
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the correct question, which is the question of what kind of legal relationships the finance
lease creates within the underlying policy. This approach seeks an analogy under which
they can allocate finance lease.

Part A of this chapter will addresses this modern US approach. It addresses the
statutory definition of finance lease under Article 2a of U.C.C. and will present the
distinctive features of the economic reality of finance lease. It is worth pointing out the
creation of so-called “economic ownership” which this approach includes..

Part B addresses the different economic tests the courts make that result in
controversy about the characterization of finance lease under this approach. This part will
address the overlap between different and distinctive kinds of contracts from which
courts in the US try to derive legal principles. A finance lease contract is, under case law
in different states, considered as a sale, a loan, or a security interest contract. This overlap
and the confusion created by it bring about diverse effects on finance lease and the parties
to such contracts.

Part C presents the critique of this approach on the basis that it increases the
uncertainty and unpredictability of finance lease. In addition it confuses the finance lease
with different and distinctive contracts. Finally, the courts under this approach
fallaciously look for who the owner is and then looks for suitable labels under which they
can connote some rights to the true owner. This makes this approach, one can argue, as
formalistic as the Egyptian approach in the sense of using some labels as a matter of logic
without presenting other underlying policies.

Part D concludes with the point that although the American approach of economic
reality of finance lease results in development of the legal treatment of finance lease, it
fails to present the right question as to what kind of relationships finance lease creates.
The economic ownership is a formalistic label that the courts use in order to connote
some rights and liabilities as a matter of course.
32

A. Economic Reality As Determinative

Contrary to the Egyptian approach to legal form, the United States Law Article 2a of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and courts focus on economic reality in defining
finance lease.118 Finance lease, according to this approach, is a financial instrument
whereby the lessor‟s mere function is to finance the use and purchase of the leased
assets.119 Based on this understanding of finance lease, Article 2a of UCC includes a
special definition for finance lease.120 It further entails special features of the relationship
finance lease may create.121

This section covers, therefore, the statutory definition, the special treatment of the
relationship under finance lease, and the taxation definition. It concludes with the point
that the U S law recognizes the financial aspect of finance lease as the only determinative
factor of finance lease. For this approach, one can conclude that the finance lessor is just
a conduit between the finance lessee and the supplier and manufacturer.
1. Statutory Definition

Article 2a define finance lease as:
A lease with respect to which:
(i) The lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the
goods;
(ii) The lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession
and the use of the goods in connection with the lease;
and
(iii) One of the following occurs;

118

U.C.C § 2A-103.
De Lage Landen Financial Services INC v. Rozentsvit, 939 A.2d 915.
120
U.C.C § 2A-103.
121
U.C.C § 2A-103.
119

33

A) The lessee receives a copy of the contract by which
the lessor acquired the goods or the right to
possession and use of the goods before signing the
lease contract;
B) The lessee‟s approval of the contract by which the
lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession
and use of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of
the lease contract. 122
2. Special Features of Finance Lease Relationship
The statutory definition addresses the financial factor of the finance lease as the
determinative factor. From the outset of this definition the following feature has to be met
in order for the relationship to qualify as a finance lease:
The definition of a finance lease includes three
requirements. First, the leased goods cannot be
selected, manufactured or supplied by the lessor. The
lessor in a finance lease serves essentially as conduit
to facilitate the acquisition of the goods the lessee
from the supplier. The lessor‟s lack of initial
involvement with the goods is the premise for
relieving the finance lessor of liability from implied
warranties.
Second, the lessor‟s acquisition of the goods must to
be “in connection with lease”. The interest that the
finance lessor acquires in the goods must be pursuant
to the envisioned finance lease. This requirement
further ensures the conduit position of a finance
lessor. It tends to ensure that the lessee will look to
the supplier for covenants and warranties, rather than
to the lessor. Consequently, the supplier, not the
finance lessor, is liable to the lessee.
The final requirement for finance lease is compliance
with one of the four method designed to ensure the
lessee receives advance notice of its rights against the
supplier. 123
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Although this statement summarizes the most import features of the finance lease
under Article 2a, it ignores another important feature which is that it must qualify as a
lease to begin with.124 The lease aspect will be discussed in part B. The remaining portion
of this part will discuss the other features as follows:

a)

Tripartite Relationship

The intuitive image of finance lease under Article 2a is a tripartite agreement:
A finance lease is the product of a three party
transaction. The supplier manufactures or supplies
the goods pursuant to the lessee‟s specification,
perhaps even pursuant to a purchase order, sales
agreement or lease agreement between the supplier
and the lessee. After the prospective finance lease is
negotiated, a purchase order, sales agreement, or
lease agreement is entered into be the lessor, and the
lessee then enter into a lease or sublease of the goods.
Due to the limited function usually performed by the
lessor, the lessee looks almost entirely to the supplier
for representations, covenant and warranties. 125
Obvious as it seems, article 2a portrays the finance lease as tripartite relationships; the
supplier, the lessee, and the lessor.
b) Financial Instrument

Finance lease is a mere financing instrument whereby a lessor is a conduit
between a finance lessee and a supplier, or manufacture126 Therefore, the first element of
the statu
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tory definition emphasizes that the lessor does not select or manufacture the leased good,
instead, the lessor acts merely as conduit between the lessee and the supplier.127 In the
De Lage case, the court of appeal emphasizes this feature by stating that:
For the purpose of a finance lease, as defined in
Article 2a of Uniform Commercial Code, the party
merely financing the transaction has no control over
its manufacture, is not involved in the selection of the
product nor in any way makes a representation as to
its quality or soundness, and, between the financier
and the ultimate purchaser, it is usually the latter who
selects the goods negotiates for its \purchase and has
control over its use. 128
Consequently, Article 2a in its subsection (i) “requires the lessor to remain
outside the selection, manufacture and supply of the goods; that is the rationale for
releasing the lessor from most of its traditional liability.”129
This unique feature distinguishes the American approach of economic reality from
the Egyptian approach of the legal form. The latter ignores the reality that the finance
lessor acts merely as a financial mediator between the supplier and the ultimate
purchaser, who is the lessee. Conversely, the American system recognizes this reality,
and, based on that, the UCC emphasizes the importance of the lessor to not be involved in
selecting the goods and the supplier.130
c) The Acquisition of The Lessor Must Be “With Connection to The
Lease”:131
This element, as it will be demonstrated in part B, is crucial in determining the nature
of the transaction. For the purpose of finance lease, the lessor‟s role is limited to
providing funding for acquisition of the lessee as the ultimate purchaser.132 Consequently,
acquisition of the lessor of the leased goods must be for the purpose of leasing them to
127
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the finance lessee as an ultimate purchaser. Therefore, usually the lessee will have the
option of purchasing the leased assets at the end of the lease term.133 Thus, the lessor
should not be involved in “marketing or supplying” the leased goods. 134 However, in
determining the existence of this element is a case by case study. 135 In each case the court
has to examine the role of the lessor in the transaction to determine whether this
transaction can be qualified as a finance lease and thus the feature of the relationship
between the lessor and the lessee.136 This element is furthermore important in the
relationship between the lessee and the supplier as the former will direct the relationship
with the supplier regardless of the absence of any legal formality in terms of any
contractual relationship.137 However, the law does not require the separation of the
supplier and finance lessor; instead, it requires that the finance lessor not get involved in
the marketing and supplying process.138 “A finance lease can be created even though the
supplier and the lessor are affiliated [ but separate legal entities].”139 Therefore, the
determinative factor here is whether the acquisition of the lessor is merely for the purpose
of the lease or not
.
d) Warranties and Representation

An additional distinctive feature of the American approach of finance lease is
warranties and representation. Unlike the Egyptian approach, Article 2a bridges the gap
between the lessee and the supplier and expands the relationship between the lessee and
the supplier giving the lessee a direct right vis-à-vis the supplier regarding the warranties
133
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and representations.140 Again, Article 2a embodies the economic substance and raises it
over the legal form of the transaction. Article 2a addresses the reality of the transaction
through giving, by law, direct privileges to the lessee regarding the express and implied
warranties and representations.141 Article 2a recognizes that the lessee is the sole
beneficiary of the leased goods and the ultimate purchaser of them. Therefore, the lessee
is the most affected party by the warranty compliance. 142 Minnan and Lawrence address
this privity problem stating that:

Although the reasonable expectation is for a finance lessee
to look to the supplier, and not to the finance lessor for most
of the implied warranties, the tripartite relationship of the
parties creates a conceptual difficulty for the finance lessee
to receive the protection of the supplier‟s warranties,
whether they are express or implied. In fact, the supply
contract, rather than extending implied warranties, might
disclaim or modify them.
Although the finance lease is the party most directly affected
by warranty compliance during the lease term, the supplier‟s
warranties run to the finance lessor as the party with whom
the supplier contracted. The finance lessee lacks privity of
contract with the supplier, thus creating a legal obstacle to
direct cause of action against the supplier for breach of
warranty in the absence of an express assignment to the
lessee of the warranties created in the supply agreement.
Article 2A addresses this privity problem in finance lease by
making the finance lessee the beneficiary of all promises and
warranties extended to the finance lessor in the supply
contract. The provision applies to both express and implied
warranties, and to warranties extended to other parties. 143

As obvious as it may seem, this approach, contrary to the Egyptian approach, fills
the legal privity problem that faces the finance lessee. However, to what extent can the
140
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lessee enjoy the privilege of direct claim of warranties compliance from the supplier?
And how does this affect the relationship between the lessor and lessee? Minnan and
Lawrence also answer these questions:
The extension of the benefit of promises and
warranties to the lessee can not be used as the basis
for implying and duty or liability of the lessee under
the supply contract. It also does not alter the
contractual relationship between the supplier and the
finance lessor.
The finance lessee does not receive all the rights
under supply contract. The breach of the warranty by
the supplier thus the lessee should entitle to reject the
tendered goods and recover damages against the
supplier. The finance lessee should not be entitled,
however, to pursue the buyer‟s remedy to recover the
purchase price.
These provisions, together with the exclusion of the
implied warranty liability for the lessor, reflect the
common understanding of parties to finance lease
that the supplier should be liable to the lessee who is
the user of goods and the finance lessor should not
incur this liabilities. 144
Apparently, one can argue, that Article 2a utilizes the metaphor of the “bundle of
sticks”145 in portraying this image of the tripartite agreement. It distributes the rights,
liabilities, privileges, immunities among the parties so that the lessor does not need to
shoulder unpredictable risks or to be liable for warranties of the goods the lessor never
selects nor knows anything about as the court of appeals aptly states in the De Lage case:

For the purpose of finance lease, as defined in article
2 A of U.C.C, the party merely financing the
transaction has no control over its manufacture, is not
involved in the selection of the product nor in any
way makes representation as to its quality or
soundness, and, between the financier and the
ultimate purchaser, it is usually the later who selects
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the goods, negotiate for its purchase, and has control
over its use. 146
From another angle, the economic reality of the transaction does not alter the
contractual relationship between the finance lessor and the supplier.147 Whether it is a
sale or a lease, the finance lessor still enjoys some rights, in the broad sense of the word,
vis-à-vis the supplier.148 It is only for the lessor to claim the cancelation of the supply
contract and seek a recovery of the price.149
To sum up, the lessee has a direct right vis-à-vis the supplier for the express and
implied warranties. The lessee can pursue damages in case of the supplier‟s failure of
warranties. The lessee, however, can not pursue a recovery of the price or cancel the
supply contract which will be limited to the finance lessor. This bundle of sticks
metaphor matches the economic reality of finance lease. Yet, in part two, this bundle of
sticks does not raise the right question concerning the finance lease and results in an
overlap between different kinds of contracts.
e) Non-cancellable “Hell and High Water Clause”

It is obvious that Article 2a embodies the policy consideration of finance lease as
an alternative financial instrument. In so doing, Article 2a emphasizes that the
relationship between the lessor and the lessee is very separate from any relationship of
the latter with third parties including the supplier.150 Incorporating the “Hell and High
water Clause,” Article 2a makes finance lease a non-cancellable contract from the lessee
side.151 In other words, the lessee‟s obligation of payment of the rentals is noncancellable.152 Under this clause, the lessee has no right to cease the payment of rentals
under finance lease despite dissatisfaction with any of the third parties including the
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supplier.153 Divorcing the obligation of the lessee to make the payment of rentals from
any other disputes the lessee may have with third parties, regarding the use of goods, is
justified as the finance lessor plays no role in selecting and manufacturing such goods.154
Some courts have gone further stating that the lessee obligation is “separate from any
alleged breach of duty by the lessor.”155 Minnan and Lawrence aptly summarize this
clause as follows:
The article 2A provision adds a special rule for
finance leases. Acceptance by a finance lessee made
with knowledge of non-conformity can not be
revoked, because of the nonconformity. The rule is
consistent with the nature of finance lease. The
finance lessor acts merely as a financing conduit
between the supplier of goods and the finance
lessee.156
However, for this clause to be valid, Article 2A requires an acceptance from the
lessee of the leased goods.157 To examine the existence of the acceptance, the court has to
test whether the lessee has a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods and “a) signifies
or acts in a way signifying the goods and conforming and b) the lessee fails to make an
effective rejection of goods.”158Based on the existence of the acceptance of the good from
the lessee, the lessee has no right with any way to revoke the lease contract and cease the
payment of the rentals.

All in all, from the outset of the features of finance lease, one can argue that,
contrary to the Egyptian approach, the American approach focuses on the finance
element of finance lease, rather than the legal form. Based on the economic reality,
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Article 2A addresses the lessor as a mere financing conduit between the supplier of goods
and the lessee as an ultimate purchaser of the goods. Therefore, the acquisition of the
lessor must be in connection with the lease in a manner that reflects no interest on the
part of the lessor in marketing or supplying the goods. Consequently, the lessee, as an
ultimate purchase, has a direct interest in the warranties and representations from the
supplier, because the lessor acts as a mere financier, and thus the lessor can not shoulder
such liability. Furthermore, Article 2A provides that the finance lessor is a mere
financing conduit, and thus the lessor has a non-cancellable right vis-à-vis the lessee of
having the payment of rental in due time.
3.

Taxation Definition
To preserve the tax integrity, the IRS creates the so called economic ownership and

allocates such to the lessee and an economic owner.159 Based on the so called economic
reality of finance lease, American law allocates the privileges of depreciation of assets to
the economic owner.160 Under this approach, the courts look closely at the nature of the
transaction and decide who the owner for the purpose of taxation is.161 In the Lyon
case,162 the Court of Appeal had to consider a lease and sale back transaction whereby the
taxpayer purchased a building under construction from a bank and leased it back to the
bank through a long-term finance lease. Based on the legal title, the District Court held a
judgment in favor of the taxpayer as the legal owner and thus entitled the depreciation of
the assets deductable from the tax to him. The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court‟s decision on the basis that the taxpayer, the finance lessor, is not the true owner of
the building; instead, it is the bank, as the latter bears substantially all the risks, benefits
and liabilities:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed. It held that the Commissioner
correctly determined that Lyon was not the true
159
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owner of the building and therefore was not entitled
to the claimed deductions. It likened ownership for
tax purposes to a "bundle of sticks" and undertook its
own evaluation of the facts. It concluded, in
agreement with the Government's contention, that
Lyon "totes an empty bundle" of ownership sticks. It
stressed the following: (a) The lease agreements
circumscribed Lyon's right to profit from its
investment in the building by giving Worthen the
option to purchase for an amount equal to Lyon's $
500,000 equity plus 6% compound interest and the
assumption of the unpaid balance of the New York
Life mortgage.\ (b) The option prices did not take into
account possible appreciation of the value of the
building or inflation. (c) Any award realized as a
result of destruction or condemnation of the building
in excess of the mortgage balance and the $ 500,000
would be paid to Worthen and not Lyon. (d) The
building rental payments during the primary term
were exactly equal to the mortgage payments. (e)
Worthen retained control over the ultimate
disposition of the building through its various options
to repurchase and to renew the lease plus its
ownership of the site. (f) Worthen enjoyed all
benefits and bore all burdens incident to the operation
and ownership of the building so that, in the Court of
Appeals' view, the only economic advantages
accruing to Lyon, in the event it were considered to
be the true owner of the property, were income tax
savings of approximately $ 1.5 million during the
first 11
years of the arrangement. The court
concluded, "In sum, the benefits, risks, and burdens
which [Lyon] has incurred with respect to the
Worthen building are simply too insubstantial to
establish a claim to the status of owner for tax
purposes. . . . The vice of the present lease is that all
of [its] features have been employed in the same
transaction with the cumulative effect of depriving
[Lyon] of any significant ownership interest." 163

163

Frank Lyon co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 569-71.

43

Obvious as it seems, the court answered the question of who the “true” owner of the
building is. For the Court of Appeals the legal owner was just a conduit and thus it was
not the true owner. In determining who the owner is, the court looked at the following:
i- Who does bear all the risks?
ii- Who does substantially benefit from the building?
iii- Whether the amount of rentals during the lease term covers all the costs plus the
interest.
iv- Whether the legal owner does not have any interest in the building or upholds a
reversionary interest in the building.
v- Whether the lessee can exercise the purchase option at the end of the lease
without any other consideration or with nominal consideration.
Based on these considerations, the court held that the legal owner is not the true
owner, instead, the bank, as an economic owner, is the true owner for the purpose of the
tax.
In conclusion, the American approach focuses substantially on economic reality,
rather than the legal formality of the transaction. The finance lessor is a mere conduit
between the supplier of goods and the finance lessee as an ultimate purchaser of the
goods. The finance lessor does not hold any reversionary interest in the leased goods.
Therefore, the American approach, based on the theory of “bundle of rights,”
redistributes the rights and liabilities in a way that fits the policy justification of finance
lease as an alternative of finance instruments. Yet, this treatment results in debate among
the scholars and courts to determine the nature and characterizations of finance lease.
B. The Implication of Economic Reality of The Transaction
Despite of the flexibility this approach may suggest, this approach has negaitive
implications on the court reasoning that result in the following consequences:
First, in answering the question of who the true owner is, the courts created
different tests resulting in different legal relationships.
Second, the courts fallaciously keep looking for analogies under which they could
allocate the finance lease to attach a bundle of rights, in the broad sense of the word, and
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logical deduction from this general analogy.164 This approach of characterization, though
fallacious reasoning, results in a struggle among the scholars and courts about which
analogy it is the best to allocate the finance lease under. 165 The statutory definition
requires the finance lease to be qualified as a “true” lease.166 However, based on the
bundle of rights and sticks, the courts have applied different analogies to finance lease.
“The most frequently litigated „commercial law‟ issue relating to personal property leases
has been whether a purported lease is a so-called „true lease‟ or merely a disguised
secured sale or loan.”167
1.True Lease; Finance Lease v. Operating Lease
The “true lease” requirement raises a conceptual difficulty to indentify the nature
of the transaction as to whether it is a “true” lease or a disguised sale, or security
interest, or loan or the like. Some scholars argue that in order to determine whether the
purported lease is a true lease, courts should economically analyze the transaction in
order to check who bears the risks and benefits of residual value at the end of the lease
term:
The courts must determine whether the lessor or lessee has
economic risk and benefits with respect to the residual value
of the equipment at the end of the lease term, if risk and
benefits reside with the lessor, the transaction should be
properly characterized as a [true] lease and if they reside with
the lessee as a secured transaction. 168
Some other scholars argue further that the courts have to determine whether “the
lessee receives only the use of property for a certain period of time with an obligation to
redeliver it at the expiration.”169
However, these arguments confuse the finance lease with an operating lease and
remove the distinguishing line between both. By definition, an operating lease also
164
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constitutes a true lease.170 In so doing, the lessor has to retain the risks and benefits of
residual value.171 The lessor also has to retain the title and transfer to the lessee the use
who eventually will return the leased goods to the lessor at the expiry date. 172 This means
that the true lease test does not distinguish between operating and finance lease.
However, finance lease, by definition, is a financial instrument, and thus usually the
lessor transfers the risks and benefits to the finance lessee. In addition, the finance lessor
does not hold any revisionary interest in the leased goods.173 This means that the finance
lease can not be a true lease in these terms. Therefore, the courts have been dealing with
finance lease as more akin to a loan, conditioned sale, or security interest.
2. Retention of Title (finance lease v. security interest)
Can you begin with a topic sentence… Since the lessor does not hold any
reversionary interest in the leased goods, nor does the lessor hold any risks or benefits
with connection to the residual value, some courts have held that retention of title is just a
mere security.174 Some courts found that giving the lessee the purchase option for no
further consideration or for nominal price makes the finance lease akin to security
interest.175 In Carison v, Giacchetll, the court embodied the economic test to determine
whether the purported lease is a true lease or a mere security interest:

In determining whether equipment lease is a true
lease or security interest, focal point of inquiry
should be straightforward economic analysis; if
obligations of lessee under lease are not subject to
termination be lessee, and if the lease is for full
economic life of goods ( or if lessee may, without
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further consideration acquire all rights in goods for
full economic life of goods) then security interest is
created, but if lessor retains reversionary interest in
goods, then transaction is true lease. 176
However, this argument is as confusing as the argument of true lease. It is
confusing as it contradicts the financial factor of finance lease. The finance lessor acts
merely as a financial conduit between the supplier and lessee. Therefore, the retention of
the title can not be more than a form of security in the case of default. Conversely, this
argument brings about the risks of the applicability of usury limits on the finance
lessor.177 Therefore, the finance lessor usually holds artificially some interest in the
leased goods through either removing the purchase option or making the determination of
the price according to the market value.178
Conversely, it is a fallacy to follow this argument, as it adds nothing to determining
the legal nature of a finance lease. A finance lease is just a financial instrument and the
financier lessor acts merely as a financier conduit.179 Therefore, the rentals of the lessee
must cover substantially the risk of residual value. Furthermore, any remaining benefit of
residual value at the end of the lease will be transferred to the lessee. This is one of the
most important incentives the finance lease provides.180 The lessee enters into a finance
lease as a financial mechanism to acquire the leased assets; preventing the lessee from
the purchase option or incorporating a price equivalent to market discourages the lessee
to seek the finance lease.181 Therefore, this argument clouds, rather than enlightens, the
right legal thinking of finance lease.
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3. Hell and High Water (Finance lease v. Loan)
Some courts have found that the finance lease is akin to or exactly like a loan in
the sense that it imposes an absolute obligation over the lessee of the payment of rentals
under the Hell and High Water Clause.182 In the De Lage case, the court characterized
the relationship between the lessor and lessee under the Hell and High Water clause as a
creditor-debtor relationship.183 Under loan, the lender lends an amount of money to the
borrower.184 Therefore, the court, in the De Lage case, applied the definition of loan on
the finance lease with the change that the finance lessor lends the equipment instead of
the money.185
However, this is a fallacious extension of the concept of loan. Loans are known as a
money borrowing instrument.186 In addition, the lessee, as a common practice, does not
return the leased goods to the lessor. Therefore, the relationship that a loan creates is
different from the one finance lease creates.

4. Economic Ownership (Finance lease v. Conditioned sale)

In the final analogy, courts have tried to allocate the finance lease under the
conditioned sale.187 In the Lyon case, the court creates the so called economic ownership
and thus found that the lessee is the true economic owner of the leased goods.188 Based
on the so-called economic reality, the court examines the economic substance of the
transaction to identify who the true owner is.189 For tax courts, the lease can be a
conditioned sale if the court finds that the lessee bears the risks and awards of the residual
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value of the goods.190 “Asking who bears the risk and reward associated with fluctuations
in residual value is a convenient way of determining whether the original has a realistic
expectation of return of something substantial.”191 Similar to this approach, the
Bankruptcy Courts can find that the purported lease is a conditioned sale and thus dismiss
the repossession claim of the lessor.192

However, changing the nature of contract of being a lease and replace it with a sale,
changes the economic incentives of the parties, and endangers the finance lease interests
in the transaction especially in the event of default. It further makes the result
unpredictable and raises the uncertainty of the transaction.193

In conclusion, phrasing the issue as to who the owner is, and to answer such a
question based on the so called economic reality, results in an overlap between the
finance lease and different kinds of contracts. In addition, it abolishes the distinctive
nature of finance lease as a finance instrument that takes the form of lease. Finance lease
is not a true lease, and it is not a security agreement, a loan or a conditioned sale. Thus,
one can wonder why the courts and scholars failed to recognize the suitable legal
characterization of finance lease.
C. Nor It Is The Economic Ownership Is The Correct Answer

Many scholars rightly argue the importance of keeping a distinctive line
between finance lease and any other different, but distinctive contracts.194 For them this
transactional approach of defining and analyzing the finance lease makes the situation
more complex, and confuses the finance lease with other distinctive contracts. 195 They
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raise two main critiques, and one can add one more. The first critique concerns the
overlap the case law results in between different and distinctive kinds of transaction.196
Treating finance lease as a conditioned sale contradicts the legal nature of finance
lease.197

The second critique concerns the uncertainty and unpredictability that affect the
leasing business. Mooney summarizes this critique in stating that:
[P]revailing case law surrounding the lease-security
interest issue reveal a hodge-podge of subjective and
extraneous criteria with which the courts are called
upon to determine the issue. It reflects a marked
failure to appreciate and consider the essential
elements of leases and secured transactions in
conceptual and historical context. The result is
plethora of contradictory authorities yielding little
outcome predictability in any given jurisdiction. The
discomfort is felt in connection with negotiation,
drafting, construction and litigation.198
However, none of these critiques has addressed the right reason. The problem is,
one can argue, that neither the economic ownership approach nor legal form ownership
approach has posed the right question about finance lease. Deciding who the owner is
and then allocating the finance lease under one different contract and connoting the legal
rights and duties as a logical deduction is transcendental nonsense.199 It is a formalistic
way of solving the issue by imposing one label after the other as a matter of logical
deduction.200 Both approaches ignore the right question, which is what kind of
relationships finance lease creates within the underlying policies. Applying some labels
to the case and deducing from them the rights and liabilities of parties is assuming what
needs to be decided. In the American approach, the courts still look for who the “true”
owner of the leased assets is. Based on the answer, they allocate certain rights, liabilities
196
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and the like to that owner. Fallacious as it may appear, this approach has not answered
the question of why we allocate such rights or liabilities to such a party. In other words,
why should the lessee be entitled to the warranties? Why should the lessor be safe from
any claim regarding the relationship between the lessee and the supplier? Like the
Egyptian law, the American legal system of finance lease suffers from the formalistic
way of defining the legal relationships of the so-called finance lease. Hale and other
realistic scholars show that law always affects the coercive powers of parties.201 This is
apparent in the finance lease regulatory system under both approaches. Either economic
reality or legal form approaches are in themselves policy justifications that affect the
coercive powers of the parties of a finance lease.
D. Conclusion
Unlike the Egyptian approach, the American approach realizes the importance of
the economic substance of the finance lease. For the American approach, the finance
lease is just a conduit between the supplier of goods and the finance lessee, the ultimate
purchaser. Based on that fact, the American approach extends some rights and privileges
to the lessee vis-à-vis the supplier. In addition, it protects the finance lessor from
guaranteeing goods the lessor does not select or manufacture. Eventually, the courts
created the so-called economic ownership as a basis for allocating some rights to the
lessee as a true economic owner. However, in determining the legal nature of the finance
lease whether it is a true lease or not, the courts have used some analogies under which
these can connote who the owner is and eventually connote the rights and duties of the
parties. This approach of identifying the finance lease clouds, rather then enlightens, the
right and distinctive characterization of finance lease. It further contrasts the finance
lease as an instrument of finance. One reason for that, as this argument goes, is that
neither the American approach, nor the Egyptian approach addresses the right question:
What kind of relationship does finance lease create within the underlying policies? Such
would be the suitable angle to look at the legal analysis of the question at stake.

201

Hale, supra note 17, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of The Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991 1996-1997.

51

IV. Hohfled and The Right Question

Putting the matter in another way, the tendency – and the fallacyhas been to treat the specific problem as if it were far less
complex than it really is; and this commendable effort to treat as
simple that which is really complex has, it is believed, furnished
a serious obstacle to the clear understanding, the orderly
statement, and the correct solution of legal problems. In short, it
is submitted that the right kind of simplicity can result only from
more searching and more discriminating analysis.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld202
This statement from the prominent professor Hohfeld summarizes the problem of
the two approaches. While the Egyptian approach seeks the simple answer of the
ownership issue under finance lease through the legal form of the ownership, the
American approach deals with finance lease with the same simplicity through the socalled economic reality and economic ownership. Neither of the two approaches has
provided a comprehensive answer and analysis to the question of ownership under
finance lease. Each of the two approaches finds the answer through some analogies of
other endless labels. Labels, such as legal or economic ownerships are wrong answers to
wrong questions.

By answering the question who the holder of the title is, the formal approach,
exemplified by Egyptian Leasing Law, results in very arbitrary consequences as it
depends solely on indentifying the holder of title without examining the real jural
relationships created within the underlying policy. In addition, this approach removes any
reference to the policy consideration and emphasizes the answering of the question of
identifying the holder of the title to attach to such holder rights, powers, liabilities and the
like as matter of logical deduction.

202

WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 26
Yale L.J. 16 1913- 1914,

52

Similarly, the economic reality approach, exemplified by the American legal
thought, is as fallacious as the formal approach. By indentifying the true owner, this
approach results in an incoherent analytical system that raises the uncertainty and
unpredictability about the judicial reasoning. In addition, this approach is as purely
formalistic as the formal approach as it looks for different labels and analogies under
which they allocate the finance lease to presume some rights, powers and the like as a
logical deduction from such general labels.

The question this thesis raises is the one Hohfeld aptly and rightly addresses and
then to apply it to finance lease: what kind of jural relationships does finance lease create
within the underlying policy? This chapter is divided into two parts: part A gives a brief
overview of Hohfled‟s analytical system of jural relationships. Through a group of eight
fundamental legal concepts that are divided into a scheme of correlatives and opposites,
Hohfeld contends that any label can be analyzed in a jural relationship in this scheme of
correlatives and opposites.203

Part B applies this analytical system to two main relationships that finance lease
creates; first the relationship between finance lessee and the supplier, and the relationship
between the lessor and the lessee. In this part, one argues that after demonstrating the
failure of using some labels of ownerships as determinative factors, the analytical system
of relationships can be the best way to distinguish the finance lease.

A. Hohfeld System
The central point of this thesis is the ownership concept under finance lease. For
Hohfeld this concept denotes a group of jural relationships between social figures within
the underlying policy.204 Through his four categories of fundamental concepts and the
scheme of correlatives and opposites he places them in, Hohfeld aptly realizes that in
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discussing any legal concept, one has to realize as a first step the relationship such a
concept may involve.205

Jural relationships within the scheme of fundamental concepts

Hohfeld criticized the classical limitation of legal relationship to only right-duty
relationships.206 For him, this is a classical misleading characterization of legal
relationships:
One of the greatest hindrances to the clear
understanding, the incisive statement, and the true
solution of legal problems frequently arises from the
express or tacit assumption that all legal relationship
may be reduced to “rights” and “duties,” and that
these latter categories are therefore adequate for the
purpose of analyzing even the most complex legal
interests.
Therefore, for him finance lease is not a mere relation between rights and duties in the
strict meaning of these concepts. Instead, he would look to the finance lease within the
framework of jural relationship of correlatives and opposites under the four categories he
establishes.207 Under these four categories there are eight terms that are arranged in table
form:208
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Jural Opposites
Rights
No-right

Privilege
Duty

Power
Disability

Immunity
Liability

Jural Correlatives
Rights
Duty

Privilege
No-right

Power
Liability

Immunity
Disability

By the “opposites-schemes,” Hohfeld focuses on one party of the relationship. That is
to say that, a single party has to have “one or the other but not both opposites.”209 For
example, the lessor under finance has a right vis-à-vis the lessee to pay the rentals or the
lessor has no right; it can not be both. Similarly, the finance lessor either has a privilege
to do certain acts or a duty not to do certain acts vis-à-vis the lessee or the others.210
Likewise, the law or contract may give immunity to the lessor regarding the warranties
and representation vis-à-vis the lessee or may make the lessor liable for such warranties,
it can not be both.

On the other hand, Hohfeld aptly and rightly emphasizes the jural relationships
between two parties or more through the correlatives scheme.211 He addresses the
solutions of legal problems through the correlatives between the parties, rather than the
labels that usually lead to confusion. Through correlatives Hohfeld proposes that when
the law allocates one of the above concepts to one party, the law “simultaneously creates
vulnerability on the others.”212 For examples, if the lessee has a right vis-à-vis the
supplier regarding the compliance of warranties and representations, the law
simultaneously creates a duty over the supplier vis-à-vis the lessee to comply with
warranties and representations.
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In addition, Hohfeld presents multi-relationships from one party towards another. .213
In other words, one party can have different jural relationships vis-à-vis different parties
that create a variety of correlatives depending on the jural relationship between this party
and each of the other parties. For instance, a supplier has a duty vis-à-vis the lessee to
comply with the warranties, according to American Law. In addition, the supplier has a
duty vis-à-vis the lessor to comply with the contract‟s conditions regarding performing
and presenting the warranties to the lessee. A failure of the supplier creates the right to
the lease for damages and the right to the lessor to cancel the contract and recover the
price.

Therefore, Hohfeld rightly argues that general terms, such as property do in
themselves, give the answer for any legal relationships.214 On the other, it is the
underlying policy that changes these jural relationships. If this is correct, then the
concepts of formal ownership or economic ownership are nothing but labels that cover
the underlying policies.
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B. Policy Justification Not Logical Deduction
To exemplify Hohfeld‟s ideas, one can look at the hypothetical questions raised in
chapter one: who is entitled to the tax credits? For Hohfeld, this question is a policy
question. The property concept can not be the answer, since this concept does not give one
answer to the question. For the formal approach, the lessor is entitled to such tax credits
on the basis of the concept of formal ownership. On the other hand, it is the lessee who is
entitled to such tax credit based on the so-called economic ownership. Fallacious as it may
appear, both concepts of ownership add nothing to right legal thinking. Why should the
lessee or the lessor be entitled to such credits? The property concept here does not give
any answer as both approaches base their respective approach on such concepts but with
different answers. To answer this question requires identifying the underlying policy.
1. Formal Approach (relationship between owner and user)
The formal approach of Egyptian law grants the lessor any right vis-à-vis the
supplier regarding the warranties and representations compliance. One policy
justification, one can argue, is to create an investment incentive for financial institutions
to provide working capital to the Egyptian market. Giving the privilege to add the assets
to its balance sheet and to deduct the depreciation, the financial institution will have more
incentive to provide working capital to the market through the finance lease.
Furthermore, Islamic compliance is another policy consideration for limiting the finance
lease to a relationship between title holder and user. Ignoring the formality of the contract
and emphasizing the financial aspect make the finance lease more akin to riba
prohibitions.215 Therefore, formality under Egyptian law is a policy consideration, rather
than a logical deduction from the concept of property.
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2. Economic Reality (A Relationship between a financial conduit and an
ultimate purchaser)

To preserve tax integrity and prevent “double dips,”216 the Economic reality
approach emphasizes the financial aspect in finance lease. Consequently, such an
approach creates the so-called economic ownership to give the privilege of tax credits to
one party instead of giving both parties tax credits. In other words, unlike the formal
approach that gives the privilege to lessor to deduct depreciation and the lessee to deduct
the rentals which is considered a double dip, the economic reality limits credit to only one
party.217 To determine this party, the American legal system employs the economic
reality test. The party that bears the risks and benefits from the function of the leased
assets is the one who is entitled to the tax credits.218
C. Jural Relationship under Finance Lease

As previously stated, for Hohfeld, any "problem seems easily to be solved"219 if it
is reduced to the lowest terms of correlatives. Likewise, finance lease distinction can be
easy if it is reduced to the lowest terms apart from those artificial terms that cloud, rather
that clarify the correct understanding. Applying Hohfeld‟s system to finance lease, one
has to search for the jural relationships finance lease creates in order to reach the intrinsic
terms of the transaction to remove the overlap between the finance lease and any other
contract. Therefore, two main jural relationships distinguish the finance lease from any
other contract: firstly, it is the relationship between the lessee and the lessor, and
secondly, the relationship between the lessor and lessee.
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1. Lessee v. the supplier
a)

Egyptian approach

According to Egyptian Law, the lessee does not have, by a rule of law, any
direct claim towards the supplier as the law applies the theory of formal ownership and
allocates all rights to the legal owner. This has led to construing the leasing contract as a
mere tenancy contract. However, this perspective of Egyptian law has proven to be
fallacious as it ignores the economic reality of the transaction.
In order to reach a correct understanding of the transaction within the
Hohfeldian analytical system, one can reduce the transaction to its lowest terms. In this
regard, the lessee does not have any right vis-à-vis the supplier.

b) American Approach
As opposed to the Egyptian approach to, Article 2A creates a direct right to the
lessee vis-à-vis a duty of the supplier to comply with the warranties. According to this
article, this right is limited to claiming the warranties and representation, and thus the
lessee has no right to claim the cancellation of the supply contract or to claim the
recovery of the price. Obvious as it seems, the application of the so called economic
ownership is just a label under which it creates a right of the lessee vis-à-vis the supplier.

2. Lessor v. Lessee
a) The Retention of The Title and Security Interest
As demonstrated above, U.S courts sometimes construe the retention of the title in
finance lease as a security interest. Fallacious as it may seem, one can reduce the jural
relationship between the lessor and lessee regarding this element. According to the terms
of the contract, the lessor retains the title and the lessee has the right of use. In legal
terms, the lessor has a “privilege” of the title vis-à-vis a “no-right” of the lessee. In
addition, the lessor has a right and privilege vis-à-vis other parties regarding the title.
Therefore, the lessor can create another correlative over the title, such as giving some
59

rights to pledge. When the lessor transfers the use to the lessee, the lessor creates a right
and privilege to the lessee to use the goods. In consideration of the financial element, the
finance lease creates for the lessor a right and privilege vis-à-vis the lessee. However,
upon default of the lessee the lessor has the power to divest the goods. On the other hand,
the security interest creates no right to the secured party except in the default of the
securing party. It just creates a power to the secured party to change the legal relation by
creating a right to divest the secured asset. According to Hohfeld, a power is a "change in
a given legal relationship that may result […] from some superadded fact or group of
facts which are under volitional control of one or more human beings.” 220 As Hohfeld
ascertains, it is obvious that reducing both transactions into their lowest terms results in
discrimination as each one of them creates different jural relationship.

b) The payment of the rental (finance lease v. loan)
Some courts in the U.S. construe finance lease as a loan in the application of the
Hell and High water clause.221 For them, the relationship between the lessor and the
lessee “is akin to or exactly-like the relationship between the creditor and debtor.”222
Fallacious as it seems, one has to reduce both relations to the lowest term to remove the
overlap between both. The lender transfers a power to the borrower whereby the latter
can change the relationship vis-à-vis a liability of the lender to not revoke this power
during a period of time. Through the power, the borrower can change the relationship and
divest the title of money and use it, and simultaneously the borrower creates a duty vis-àvis a right of the lender to repay a similar amount with the interest within a certain
amount of time.

In finance lease, the contract creates mutual right-duty relationships. The lessor
has a duty vis-à-vis the lessee who has the right to use the goods. Simultaneously, the
lessor has a right vis-à-vis the lessee who in turn has a duty to pay the rental in due time.
220
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In addition, as the lessor does not select or manufacture or participate in the marketing,
these negative operative facts create immunity for the lessor vis-à-vis the lessee‟s
disability to cease the payment for any disputes with third parties.

c)

Economic Ownership (finance lease and conditional sale)

Based on the so called economic reality, some courts in the U.S. construe the
finance lease as a conditional sale and give the lessee the so-called economic
ownership.223 One reason for this argument is the incorporation of a purchase option with
a nominal price.

Again, in order to remove this fallacious overlap between those transactions, one
has to reduce both transactions to their lowest terms.

Conditional sale gradually creates the power of the purchase upon the payment of
full installment, vis-à-vis the seller to divest the title. Also the rule of law creates a
privilege to the purchaser to enjoy the tax credits of the depreciation of the assets.
One the other hand, in finance lease, the lessee will have this power only if the
lessee uses the purchase option and pays the price, and thus the payment of the rental in
itself does not such power. Only when the lessee declares the desire to purchase the
goods and pay the price the power to the lessee to divest the title is created.
Tax treatment, thus, is a separate relationship. The law can change the
relationship between the parties and create a privilege to the lessee vis-à-vis no-right to
the lessor to the tax credit of the depreciation of the asset. :

The renowned Professor Hohfeld provides a legal analytical system based on
eight fundamental concepts. Through this analytical system, one can address the fallacy
in both approaches of finance lease. Economic or formal ownership are just operative
223
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facts through which the jural relationships are created. These labels themselves do not
provide a correct understanding of the different transactions. On the contrary, they result
in confusion and overlap between the different transactions. In this regard, one can use
the Hohfeldian system to distinguish between finance lease and different kinds of
contracts. This distinction is of practical importance as the finance lease is one of the
most important financial instruments in recent time. Therefore, abolishing the finance
lease and allocating it under different labels is a fallacy that raises risks or
unpredictability and uncertainty of the law. Likewise, ignoring the economic factor of
finance lease and treating it as a mere property contract is another fallacy that confuses
finance lease with different transactions. It also confuses the relationship between finance
lease and the other transactions.

Through attacking the labels, Hohfeld does two things to help understand the
modern economic transaction. The first thing, one can argue, is in identifying the
underlying policy to understand the different options for constructing

architect the

modern legal system. The second thing Hohfeld does is to analyze the jural relationships
within these underlying policies.

Based on this analytical system, one can understand this economic transaction
called finance lease. First, one has to understand the underlying policy to know the
options and then to analyze the jural relationships that are created within the underlying
policy.
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V. Conclusion

In the recent reform of the Egyptian regulatory system of finance lease, one can
appreciate the importance of the realization of the economic and financial factors of
finance lease. Throughout this thesis, one has tried to address the fallacy of treating
finance lease as a mere legal form or a mere economic form. Both add nothing to correct
legal thinking. In addition, this addresses a critique of both approaches as they raise the
risks that affect the business of the finance lease. Hence, it is not recommended to change
the Egyptian law on the basis of the economic reality. Economic reality does not provide
the right understanding of the legal relationships of the finance lease. At the same time, it
is recommended to realize the jural relationships which finance lease creates within the
underlying policies. In other words, any change of the law will affect the jural
relationship of finance lease. Therefore, the lawmaker has to look for two things: Firstly,
the lawmaker has to identify the underlying policy which the lawmaker wants to protect
under the finance lease law. In other words, the lawmaker has to answer the question of
whether finance lease is an alternative instrument of finance to both parties whereby one
party provides working capital to the other party to facilitate its business. One can argue
that the Egyptian law maker has already answered this question by putting finance lease
as one of the alternative finance instruments mentioned in law no 10 of 2009 on the
establishment of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority. Secondly, based on this
assumption, the finance lease law has to identify the underlying policies that govern the
relationships between the parties of the transactions. In other words, the lawmaker has to
answer the question as to what kinds of rights and liabilities should be allocated to the
lessor or the lessee. Thirdly, the lawmaker does not need to identify the owner of the
property. Instead, the law has to accurately construct the jural relationship based on the
underlying policies. Therefore, the question before the court will be what kind of
relationship is created through this transaction.
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